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Abstract
This paper extends the revelation principle to environments in
which the mechanism designer cannot fully commit to the outcome
induced by the mechanism. We show that he may optimally use a
direct mechanism under which truthful revelation is an optimal strat-
egy for the agent. In contrast with the conventional revelation prin-
ciple, however, the agent may not use this strategy with probability
one. Our results apply to contracting problems between a principal
and a single agent. By reducing such problems to well–deﬁned pro-
gramming problems they provide a basic tool for studying imperfect
commitment.
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assistance.1 Introduction
This paper provides a modiﬁed version of the revelation principle for envi-
ronments in which the party in the role of the mechanism designer cannot
fully commit to the outcome induced by the mechanism. This version is a
prerequisite for solving contracting problems between a principal and a single
agent in situations where contractual commitments are limited. The revela-
tion principle, which has been shown by Gibbard (1973), Green and Laﬀont
(1977), Dasgupta et. al. (1979) and Myerson (1979), is the guiding princi-
ple for the theory of implementation and mechanism design under imperfect
information. It states that the range of implementable outcomes is simply
the set of outcomes that give no incentive to the agent to misrepresent his
type. This eﬀectively reduces the problem of ﬁnding an optimal mechanism
within the set of all conceivable mechanisms to a straightforward maximiza-
tion problem subject to so–called incentive compatibility constraints. This
reduction of complexity makes the revelation principle the universal starting
point for the analysis of contracting and mechanism design problems.
Yet, an important drawback of the revelation principle is that it is only
applicable to settings in which the mechanism designer is able to credibly
commit to any outcome of the mechanism.1 Especially for contractual rela-
tionships this requirement has implications that may be unrealistic. First,
in a long–term relationship the mechanism designer has to specify a contract
that covers the entire time horizon of the relationship. Second, he must
be able to resist renegotiating away ex post ineﬃciencies. This is a serious
problem because under asymmetric information the ex ante optimal contract
typically exhibits ex post ineﬃcient outcomes. To assume that such con-
tracts will not be renegotiated somehow runs against the central postulate
of contract theory that all beneﬁts from trade will be exploited. Third, any
action that the mechanism designer may take must be veriﬁable so that it
can be speciﬁed as part of the mechanism.
If any of these conditions is not met, the argument of the conventional
revelation principle fails for a simple reason: Suppose that, in accordance
with truthful revelation, the agent reveals his type. Then the mechanism de-
signer is practically fully informed. Clearly, he will exploit this information
for all those decisions to which he is not committed by the mechanism. Since
1The revelation principle may fail not only because of imperfect commitment; it also
does not apply to situations where several mechanism designers compete against each
other. We do not address the second case, which is studied by Epstein and Peters (1996)
and Martimort and Stole (1999).
1the agent anticipates this, he may realize that truthfully reporting his private
information is disadvantageous for him. Therefore, the standard revelation
principle fails with imperfect commitment. In fact, in settings of imperfect
commitment it is easy to construct mechanisms whose outcome cannot be
replicated by a direct mechanism. This observation makes the analysis of im-
plementable allocations highly complicated as there is no obvious restriction
on the set of conceivable mechanisms.
In a contracting problem, however, the parties care about implementable
allocations and the communication game only insofar as their payoﬀs are
aﬀected. This argument, which is used also in Maskin and Tirole (1999),
allows us to extend the two most essential features of the revelation principle
to situations with imperfect commitment. Indeed, we are able to prove that
the payoﬀs on the Pareto frontier of an arbitrary mechanism may also be ob-
tained by a direct mechanism, in which the agent’s message space is simply
the set of his types. Further, under this mechanism it is an optimal strategy
for the agent to reveal his type truthfully and he will use this strategy with
positive probability. As an important consequence, also in the presence of
imperfect commitment an optimal mechanism can still be found in the set of
incentive compatible direct mechanisms. In contrast with the full commit-
ment case, however, incentive compatibility of truthful reporting is no longer
suﬃcient for implementation. This is so because typically the agent has to
be kept indiﬀerent between truthfully revealing his information and cheating,
which may occur with positive probability. Nonetheless, our version of the
revelation principle allows us to formulate the mechanism designer’s prob-
lem as a straightforward programming problem. We thus provide a basic tool
for studying mechanism design problems that involve sequential contracting,
renegotiation or incomplete contracts.
Our result is relevant for the large part of contract theory that studies
contracting problems between a principal and a single agent. In this area,
the analysis of limited commitment has become a major direction of research.
This research is generally well aware of the unfortunate gap in implementa-
tion theory that arises because the derivation of optimal contracts cannot
appeal to the conventional revelation principle. Filling this gap is the main
purpose of this paper.
In many cases, the literature on contracting with limited commitment
simply sidesteps this problem by imposing artiﬁcial restrictions on the form
of contracts. This approach is not fully satisfactory as the ‘optimal’ con-
tract under these restrictions may not be fully optimal within the set of all
conceivable contracts. In Freixas, Guesnerie, and Tirole (1988), for instance,
2the principal is constrained to linear contracts and cannot use a revelation
mechanism. Similarly, Dewatripont’s (1989) analysis of renegotiation–proof
labor contracts simply imposes incentive compatibility restrictions without
justifying them. A justiﬁcation for this procedure is given in this paper.2 In
their study of regulatory dynamics without commitment, Laﬀont and Tirole
(1993, chapter 9) focus on the two–type case and restrict the regulator to
oﬀering a menu of two contracts. They acknowledge that they “did not ﬁnd
any argument to exclude generally menus with more than two contracts” (p.
390). This paper provides an argument for why their approach involves no
loss of generality.
Only a small part of the literature explicitly allows for general mecha-
nisms to derive optimal contracts (Hart and Tirole (1988), Laﬀont and Ti-
role (1990)). These papers, however, do not present a generalizable concept
to characterize the structure of optimal contracts. Rather, they derive for a
particular setting some speciﬁc form of the general result established here.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a gen-
eral model of contracting with imperfect commitment. It also contains an
example which we use in the following sections to illustrate our results. In
Section 3 we show ﬁrst that with a message set of the same dimensionality
as the set of the agent’s types, the mechanism designer can get the same
payoﬀ as from solving a contracting problem with an arbitrary message set.
In Section 4, we prove in a second step the optimality of a direct mechanism
under which the agent has a weak incentive to reveal his type truthfully.
The application of our results enables us to state the contracting problem
with imperfect commitment as a well–deﬁned optimization problem, which
we describe in Section 5. Section 6 shows that multi–stage mechanism design
problems can be reduced to standard dynamic programming problems. All
proofs are relegated to an Appendix.
2 Contracting with Limited Commitment
We consider a contracting problem between a principal and a single agent in
an adverse selection environment. The solution of this problem determines
an allocation z = (x;y) 2 Z = X  Y: An allocation consists of two types of
decision variables: By X we denote all those decisions to which the principal
can contractually commit himself. In contrast, Y describes all those decisions
2At the same time, however, Dewatripont (1989) does not allow the informed party to
randomize. Given our results, this seems restrictive.
3that are not contractible and are chosen at the principal’s discretion. Both
X and Y are taken to be metric spaces and we denote by X and Y the
Borel algebra on X and Y; respectively. We allow for the possibility that
the decision x restricts the principal’s feasible choices in Y and describe this
restriction by a correspondence F:X ) Y:3 Thus, the principal has to select
y 2 F(x) when he is committed to the decision x 2 X:
The principal has no private information. The agent, however, is pri-
vately informed about his type t 2 T = ft1;:::;ti;:::;tjTjg: We assume that
2  jTj < 1.4 The principal only knows the probability distribution
 = (1;:::;i;:::;jTj) of the agent’s type, with i > 0;i = 1;:::;jTj; and
P
i i = 1: The payoﬀs of both players depend on the allocation (x;y) and
the agent’s type: When the agent is of type ti; the principal’s payoﬀ from
(x;y) is Vi(x;y): The agent’s payoﬀ in this situation is Ui(x;y): Both Vi()
and Ui() are assumed to be continuous and bounded on Z:
To solve his problem, the principal will require the agent to provide some
kind of information. He therefore chooses a message set M so that the agent
has to select some message m 2 M: Let M be a metric space and let M
denote the Borel algebra on M: The principal can commit himself to a
measurable decision function x:M ! X: The interpretation is that, once
the principal has committed himself to the decision function x(); the agent
can enforce the decision x(m) by sending the message m: A mechanism or
contract Γ = (M;x) speciﬁes a message set M in combination with a decision
function x():
A mechanism Γ induces the following game between the principal and
the agent: First, the agent selects some message m 2 M: This determines
the contractually speciﬁed decision x(m) 2 X: The principal uses the agent’s
message to update his beliefs about the agent’s type and chooses some de-
cision y 2 F(x(m)): Given Γ; the principal is constrained to the allocations
that can be obtained through the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of this game.
More formally, the agent’s strategy in this game is a mapping q:T ! Q;
where Q is the set of probability measures on M: Thus, if qi(H) > 0 for some
ti 2 T and H 2 M; this means the message chosen by the titype agent
lies in H with probability qi(H): Let ¯ q 
P
i i qi and note that ¯ q 2 Q: The
principal’s strategy is a measurable function y:M ! F(x(m)): Thus y(m)
describes his choice as a function of the observed message m: We denote
3For every x 2 X; the algebra on F(x) is taken to be the Borel algebra which is
naturally induced by Y:
4Throughout we denote by jAj the cardinality of a set A:
4the principal’s posterior belief by the measurable mapping p:M ! P; where




i pi = 1g is the set of probability distributions over T: Thus,
when the principal observes the message m 2 M; he believes that the agent
is of type ti with probability pi(m): For a given contract Γ = (M;x) and a
given strategy combination (q;y); the expected payoﬀs for the principal and














To constitute a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, the functions (q;p;y) have
to satisfy three conditions: First, the principal’s strategy has to be optimal





0) for all y
0 2 F(x(m)): (2)
Second, the agent anticipates the principal’s behavior y and chooses q to








i(m) for all q
0
i 2 Q: (3)
Finally, the principal’s posterior belief has to be consistent with Bayes’ rule
on the support of the agent’s message strategy, except possibly for a set of
messages that have measure zero under this strategy. That is, for all ti 2 T
and all H 2 M with ¯ q(H) > 0 it is required that
Z
H
pi(m)d¯ q(m) = iqi(H): (4)
By this condition, the principal’s posterior is compatible with Bayesian up-
dating: After dividing both sides of (4) by ¯ q(H) > 0, the left hand side
represents the principal’s belief that he confronts agent ti upon receiving a
message from the set H. The right hand side expresses the conditional prob-
ability that the agent is actually of type ti given that, under the reporting
strategy q; a message in the set H is realized. By Radon–Nikodym’s Theorem
(see e.g. Stokey and Lucas (1989), p. 194), equation (4) deﬁnes p uniquely
¯ qalmost everywhere.5
5In terms of the Radon–Nikodym derivative, condition (4) may be expressed as pi(m) =
[diqi(m)]=[d¯ q(m)]: Of course, the belief p determines the principal’s choice of y also for
out–of–equilibrium messages. Yet, Bayes’ rule imposes no restrictions on beliefs outside
the support of the agent’s reporting strategy,
5We say that (q;p;y;xjM) is incentive feasible if (q;p;y) is a Perfect
Bayesian equilibrium given the mechanism Γ: For a given message set M;
(q;p;y;xjM) is said to be incentive eﬃcient if it is incentive feasible and














for all ti 2 T:6 Finally, (q;p;y;xjM) and (q0;p0;y0;x0jM0) are payoﬀ–equivalent
if V (q;y;xjM) = V (q0;y0;x0jM0) and U
i (q;y;xjM) = U
i (q0;y0;x0jM0) for
all ti 2 T:
In most contracting problems, the agent has the option to refuse to con-
tract with the principal. If we let ¯ Ui denote the payoﬀ that the type ti-




i (q;y;xjM)  ¯ Ui for all ti 2 T: (6)
These constraints guarantee that the agent can obtain his reservation payoﬀ
ex post after he has learned his type.7 Indeed, (6) ensures that for each type
ti there is a message m 2 M such that Ui(x(m);y(m))  ¯ Ui: When the
contract is concluded before the agent knows his type, the principal only has





i i ¯ Ui instead of the stronger
condition (6). Although we focus our discussion on the case where (6) is
relevant, it should be clear that our results also cover problems in which the
contract only has to satisfy an ex ante individual–rationality constraint for
the agent.
For a given M; the principal’s problem is to ﬁnd a (q;p;y;x) that maxi-
mizes his expected payoﬀ subject to the constraints (2)–(4) and (6). Obvi-
ously, any solution to this problem must be incentive eﬃcient. In addition, of
course, the principal’s overall problem includes the choice of an appropriate
message set M: In the following sections we illustrate our analysis of this
problem by an example which is adopted from Miyazaki (1977).
Example There are two types of the agent; each type is equally likely.
The principal chooses the agent’s speed s of work and pays the wage w: The
6When the set of incentive feasible outcomes is non–empty, one may guarantee the
existence of an incentive eﬃcient outcome by assuming that M and Z are compact and
that F() is continuous.
7For convenience, we assume throughout that the principal wants all types to partici-
pate, which is optimal if his outside option from not employing a particular type is small
enough. Our results, however, are applicable also in the case where the inequality in (6)















Figure 1: The Agent’s Indiﬀerence Curves
principal’s and the agent’s payoﬀs are
V1(w;s) = 10s  s
2  w; V2(w;s) = 10s  s
2=4  w; (7)
U1(w;s) = w  s
2=5; U2(w;s) = w  s
2=6; ¯ U1 = ¯ U2 = 0:
Notice that the agent’s utility functions satisfy the ‘single–crossing property’.
This is illustrated in Figure 1 which depicts two indiﬀerence curves, I2 and
I0
2; for the type t2 agent and the indiﬀerence curve I1; along which the payoﬀ
of type t1 equals zero. When both w and s are contractible, the principal
can fully commit himself and Z = X = f(w;s)jw  0;s  0g: If however s is
not veriﬁable and hence not contractible, the principal can commit himself
only to w: In this case X = fwjw  0g and Y = fsjs  0g: As a reference
point, we note that the ﬁrst best solution under perfect information satisﬁes
s(ti) = argmax(Vi + Ui); which yields s(t1) = 25=6 and s(t2) = 12: 
To emphasize the generality of our framework, we conclude this section
by some further examples of the environment described above.
Unobservable actions As in our example, the principal’s decision y may not
be contractible because it is not publicly observable. Another example is the
model of Khalil (1997), where the principal can perform an audit to verify the
agent’s type, but commitment to a speciﬁc auditing strategy is not possible.
Short–term contracts As in Freixas et al. (1985) and Laﬀont and Tirole
(1987), imperfect commitment arises in a two-period contracting model in
which contracts binds the contracting parties for the current period only.
That is, after the contract x expires, the principal oﬀers a new contract y for
the second period.
7Renegotiation When the principal receives the message m; he may realize
that the contract x(m) is ex–post ineﬃcient. As in Laﬀont and Tirole (1990)
he will then propose a new contract y; which the agent can either accept or
reject. Since the agent can insist on the original contract x(m); this imposes
a restriction F(x(m)) on the set of contracts Y that the principal can achieve
through renegotiation.
Cheap talk When Z = Y; the principal faces no commitment and so the
agent’s message m has no direct impact on the allocation. It can only play a
role when it aﬀects the principal’s decision via his beliefs about the agent’s
type. In this situation the revelation game reduces to a cheap talk game as
in Crawford and Sobel (1982).
As we show in Section 6, one can apply our approach also to multi–stage
mechanism design problems. By the technique of dynamic programming,
such a problem can be stated as a sequence of static problems. This allows
us to treat each contracting stage in the terms of our model.
3 Direct Mechanisms
The mechanism Γ = (M;x) is said to be a direct mechanism if M = T: With
a direct mechanism the message set is the agent’s type set and in the game
induced by Γ the agent simply announces some type.
As a special case of the environment described in the previous section, the
principal may be able to commit himself to all relevant decisions. This is the
case when Z = X: Then conditions (2) and (4) are redundant and condition
(3) deﬁnes an optimal reporting strategy for the agent. In this situation, it
is well–known that the following important observation applies:8
Revelation Principle Assume Z = X: If (q;xjM) is incentive feasible, then
there exists a direct mechanism Γd = (T; ˆ x) and an incentive feasible (ˆ q; ˆ xjT)
such that (ˆ q; ˆ xjT) and (q;xjM) are payoﬀ–equivalent. Moreover, ˆ qi(ti) = 1
for all ti 2 T:
The revelation principle greatly simpliﬁes the principal’s problem for two
reasons: First, it allows him to select as his message set simply the set of
the agent’s types. Second, he can restrict himself to an allocation function
8The standard revelation principle requires that the principal can commit to proba-
bilistic decisions. Therefore, the following statement assumes that X represents the set
of probability distributions over deterministic decisions and that Ui(x) and Vi(x) are the
expected payoﬀs from the distribution x:
8z:T ! X which gives the agent no incentive to misrepresent his type. Thus,
for each ti 2 T; we can replace the constraint (3) by the incentive compatibility
conditions
Ui(z(ti))  Ui(z(tj)) for all tj 2 T: (8)
The incentive compatibility conditions eﬀectively summarize the restrictions
that the principal faces because he is uninformed about the agent’s type. For
an incentive compatible allocation, the individual rationality constraints (6)
become
Ui(z(ti))  ¯ Ui; for all ti 2 T: (9)
Thus, in the case of full commitment, the revelation principle reduces the
contracting problem to a straightforward programming problem: The prin-
cipal has to select an allocation function z() that maximizes his expected
payoﬀ
P
i i Vi(z(ti)) subject to the incentive compatibility and individual ra-
tionality constraints (8) and (9). We now derive the solution of this problem
for our example in Section 2.
Example With full commitment, the principal chooses z(t1) = (w(t1);s(t1))
and z(t2) = (w(t2);s(t2)) to maximize his expected payoﬀ subject to the
constraints (8) and (9). Since ¯ U1 = ¯ U2 = 0; it is easy to show that because
of the single–crossing property only the constraints
U2(w(t2);s(t2)) = U2(w(t1);s(t1)); U1(w(t1);s(t1)) = 0; (10)
are binding. Maximizing 0:5[V1(w(t1);s(t1)) + V2(w(t2);s(t2))] subject to
(10) yields the allocation function
ˆ s(t1) = 150=37; ˆ s(t2) = 12; ˆ w(t1) = 4500=1369; ˆ w(t2) = 33606=1369; (11)
which is illustrated in Figure 1. A comparison with the ﬁrst best solution
under perfect information shows that ˆ s(t1) < s(t1) and ˆ s(t2) = s(t2): Thus
there is ‘no distortion at the top’. Also, the type t2 agent earns an ‘informa-
tional rent’ because U2(ˆ w(t2); ˆ s(t2)) > 0: 
The underlying idea of the standard revelation principle is to combine the
two functions q:T ! Q and x:M ! X to a single function ˆ x:T ! X: In this
way, any incentive feasible (q;xjM) can be replaced by an incentive feasible
(ˆ q; ˆ xjT) that induces the same probability distribution over allocations. At
least this is possible as long as the principal can commit himself to the entire
allocation ˆ z = ˆ x: With imperfect commitment, however, the procedure of the
9standard revelation principle is no longer applicable. We demonstrate this
in the setting of our example by showing that a contract Γ may support an
outcome that cannot be replicated by a direct mechanism Γd:
Example Suppose the principal can commit himself to the wage w but not
to the speed of work s so that X = fwjw  0g and Y = fsjs  0g: Consider
the message set M = fm1;m2;m3g and let
s(m1) = 5; s(m2) = 10; s(m3) = 20; (12)
w(m1) = 5; w(m2) = 20; w(m3) = 70:
Since s = 20=(1 + 3p1) maximizes p1V1(w;s) + (1  p1)V2(w;s); it follows
that the belief
p1(m1) = 1; p1(m2) = 1=3; p1(m3) = 0: (13)
supports the principal’s choice of s(). Therefore, (12) and (13) satisfy con-
dition (2). Condition (3) is satisﬁed for the agent’s reporting strategy
q1(m1) = 3=4; q1(m2) = 1=4; q1(m3) = 0; (14)
q2(m1) = 0; q2(m2) = 1=2; q2(m3) = 1=2:
because by (7) and (12)
U1(w(m1);s(m1)) = U1(w(m2);s(m2)) > U1(w(m3);s(m3)); (15)
U2(w(m2);s(m2)) = U2(w(m3);s(m3)) > U2(w(m1);s(m1)):
The belief in (13) is consistent with (14) and so condition (4) is satisﬁed.
Thus (q;p;s;wjM) is incentive feasible. Since q1(mh) + q2(mh) > 0 for all
mh 2 M; each s(mh) is implemented with positive probability. With the
message set T = ft1;t2g; however, condition (2) implies that at most two
diﬀerent values s(t1) and s(t2) can be implemented because the principal’s
payoﬀ is strictly concave in s: 
At least at ﬁrst sight, the design of eﬃcient mechanisms or optimal con-
tracts faces a serious problem from the observation that a direct mecha-
nism may not support all outcomes that are implementable through some
other type of mechanism. It is therefore unclear how to characterize the
set of implementable allocations. Yet, as we argued in the Introduction, we
can circumvent this problem by focusing on payoﬀs rather than allocations.
As we demonstrate in the remainder of this section, any incentive eﬃcient
(q;p;y;xjM) can be replaced by some payoﬀ–equivalent (q0;p;y;xjM) in such
10a way that the support of the agent’s reporting strategy q0 contains at most
jTj elements. This means that the principal can solve his contracting problem
by using a message set of dimension jTj:
To prove the main result of this section, we employ the following technical
lemma, which states a ﬁrst–order condition implied by incentive eﬃciency.
Lemma 1 Let (q;p;y;xjM) be incentive eﬃcient. Then there exists a  =








pi(m) ¯ q  almost everywhere:
We now use Caratheodory’s theorem (see e.g. Rockafellar (1970), p. 155)
to derive from q another reporting strategy q0 that also satisﬁes the eﬃciency
condition of Lemma 1. This leads us to the following result.
Proposition 1 Let (q;p;y;xjM) be incentive eﬃcient. Then there exist an
incentive feasible (q0;p;y;xjM) and a ﬁnite set M0 = fm1;:::;mh;:::mjM0jg 2
M with jM0j  jTj and ¯ q 0(M0) = 1 such that (q;p;y;xjM) and (q0;p;y;xjM)




jTj(mh)); h = 1;:::;jM0j; are linearly independent.
The basic idea for deriving the reporting strategy q0 can easily be ex-
plained for the case where M = fm1;:::;mh;:::;mjMjg is a ﬁnite set. If a
mechanism uses more messages than types, then the vectors q(mh) 6= 0;
h = 1;:::;jMj; are necessarily linearly dependent. This means that some
messages are redundant: The principal’s belief p can be made consistent
with Bayes’ rule in (4) also if the agent selects a reporting strategy q0 that
uses at most jTj messages. To see this, suppose for simplicity that ¯ q(mh) > 0
for all mh 2 M: Since Bayes’ rule then implies
P
h pi(mh)¯ q(mh) = i; the
vector  lies in the convex hull of the vectors p(mh) = (p1(mh);:::;pjTj(mh));
h = 1;:::;jMj: The dimension of this convex hull is smaller or equal to jTj1
because
P
i pi(mh) = 1: Caratheodory’s theorem therefore asserts that
X
hh p(mh) =  (16)
has a non–negative solution  such that at most jTj of the scalars h;h =
1;:::;jMj; are positive. This allows us to deﬁne the reporting strategy q0
by setting q0





hh pi(mh)=i = 1: Obviously, the support of ¯ q 0 contains at
11most jTj messages and p and q0 are consistent with Bayesian updating. Note
that the support of ¯ q 0 is contained in the support of ¯ q: This means that
the allocations which are realized under (q0;p;y;xjM) are a subset of the
allocations that can occur under (q;p;y;xjM):
Since replacing q by q0 does not alter the principal’s belief, his choice of y
remains optimal. Also, using the fact that q0 satisﬁes the eﬃciency condition
stated in Lemma 1, one can show that the principal’s expected payoﬀ is not
changed. Finally, the agent’s reporting behavior q0 is optimal and he receives
the same expected payoﬀ under q and q0; because he is indiﬀerent between
all messages that he selects with positive probability. The latter point also
explains our observation in Bester and Strausz (2000) that Proposition 1 may
fail in environments with multiple agents. The reason is that applying the
above procedure to the reporting behavior of one of the agents may reduce
the expected payoﬀ of another agent so that individual rationality may be
violated.
4 Incentive Compatibility
Proposition 1 reduces the complexity of the contracting problem drastically.
It allows the principal to disregard message sets which contain more messages
than the agent’s types. Yet, Proposition 1 is not very speciﬁc about the
message set and the agent’s reporting behavior. Its second part, however,
provides information that we can exploit to reduce the complexity of the
contracting problem even further. In addition, it enables us to formulate
our results in such a way that we can relate them to incentive compatibility
conditions implied by the standard revelation principle.
Our argument uses the linear independence of the vectors q0(mh); h =
1;:::;jM0j; in Proposition 1 to apply the classical marriage theorem. This
theorem, which we restate in the next lemma, was ﬁrst stated and shown in
its deﬁnitive form in Hall (1935) and Maak (1936). Weyl (1949) introduced
the term ‘marriage theorem’.9 We rely on a statement and a proof found in
Jacobs (1969, pp. 105–106).
9The interpretation of Lemma 2 as the marriage theorem identiﬁes H with a set of men,
where each man h has some acquaintances D(h) in the set of women K: The mapping d
represents a marriage which by (i) respects monogamy and by (ii) associates each man
only with one of his acquaintances. We are grateful to Hans Haller for informing us about
the marriage theorem and its usefulness in the present context.
12Lemma 2 Let H be a ﬁnite non–empty set and K be a non–empty set,
possibly inﬁnite. Further, let D:H ) K be a correspondence and for any set





Then there exists a mapping d:H ! K such that
(i) d(h) = d(k) implies h = k; and
(ii) d(h) 2 D(h) for all h 2 H;
if and only if jD(G)j  jGj for all G  H.
We apply the marriage theorem to the sets M0 and T in our Proposition
1 by deﬁning D:M0 ) T so that D(mh) denotes the set of all types that use
message mh with positive probability. By the theorem we can then associate
with each message mh 2 M0 a type d(mh) 2 D(mh) in such a way that
two distinct messages are never associated with the same type. This allows
us to construct a direct mechanism whose properties are very similar to the
standard revelation principle.
Proposition 2 If (q;p;y;xjM) is incentive eﬃcient, then there exists a di-
rect mechanism Γd = (T; ˆ x) and an incentive feasible (ˆ q; ˆ p; ˆ y; ˆ xjT) such that
(ˆ q; ˆ p; ˆ y; ˆ xjT) and (q;p;y;xjM) are payoﬀ–equivalent. Moreover, ˆ qi(ti) > 0 for
all ti 2 T:
The diﬀerences between Proposition 2 and the conventional revelation
principle indicate the implications of imperfect commitment: While the con-
ventional revelation principle applies whenever (q;p;y;xjM) is incentive fea-
sible, our result uses the stronger requirement of incentive eﬃciency. Yet, as
we argued above, this does not restrict the usefulness of our result as a tool
for the design of eﬃcient contracts. The other diﬀerence between Proposition
2 and the conventional revelation principle is that we can no longer guarantee
that the agent reveals his type with certainty. Still, as ˆ qi(ti) > 0; truthful
reporting is an optimal strategy for the agent and he chooses this strategy
with positive probability.10
5 Optimal Contracts
The important insight from Proposition 2 is that with a direct mechanism
the principal can get at least the same payoﬀ as from solving his contracting
10This does not preclude that two types ti and tj choose a fully pooling strategy with
qi(t) = qj(t) for all t 2 T:
13problem with some other message set. Moreover, without loss of generality
he may restrict himself to an incentive compatible allocation function z =
(x;y):T ! Z; under which no type ti of the agent can gain by reporting
some other type tj 6= ti: These two observations allow us to formulate the







s.t. Ui(z(ti))  Ui(z(tj)); (18)
Ui(z(ti))  ¯ Ui; (19)







kk qk(tj) = i qi(tj); (22)
for all ti;tj 2 T: The ﬁrst two constraints represent the usual incentive com-
patibility and individual rationality restrictions. Because of his inability to
commit himself to a decision y 2 Y; the principal faces three additional con-
straints. First, whenever it is optimal to induce the ti-type agent to report
some tj 6= ti; he has to be kept indiﬀerent between reporting ti and tj; which
is equivalent to condition (20). Second, the principal’s choice of y has to
satisfy condition (2) so that (21) must be satisﬁed.11 Finally, the condition
of Bayesian consistency in (4) requires (22). We now apply this programming
problem to derive the solution for our example.
Example When the principal cannot commit himself to s; constraint (21)
requires his choice of s(ti) to maximize p1(ti)V1(w;s) + (1  p1(ti))V2(w;s):
This implies
s(ti) = 20=(1 + 3p1(ti)): (23)
It is easy to see that because of the single–crossing property the incentive
compatibility constraint is binding only for one type of the agent. Consider
the case where this is the agent of type t1: Then we have ˜ q2(t1) = 0; ˜ q2(t2) = 1
and
U1(w(t2);s(t2)) = U1(w(t1);s(t1)); U1(w(t1);s(t1)) = 0; (24)
and this is suﬃcient to guarantee that (18), (19) and (20) are satisﬁed. By
(22) the principal’s beliefs are
p1(t1) = 1; p1(t2) = [1  q1(t1)]=[2  q1(t1)]: (25)
11In some applications this condition can be more conveniently formulated as a ﬁrst–
order condition.
14He thus maximizes 0:5[q1(t1)V1(w(t1);s(t1)) + (1  q1(t1))V1(w(t2);s(t2)) +
V2(w(t2);s(t2))] subject to (24) and
s(t1) = 5; s(t2) = [40  20q1(t1)]=[5  4q1(t1)]: (26)
The solution yields ˜ q1(t1) = ˜ q1(t2) = 1=2 and the allocation function12
˜ s(t1) = 5; ˜ s(t2) = 10; ˜ w(t1) = 5; ˜ w(t2) = 20; (27)
which is illustrated in Figure 1. The principal’s expected payoﬀ is 55=2: This
is indeed the highest payoﬀ that he can get because by the same procedure one
may verify that by keeping the type t2 agent indiﬀerent between (w(t1);s(t1))
and (w(t2);s(t2)) he can only get 136=5: Interestingly, the comparison with
the ﬁrst–best outcome s and the full commitment solution ˆ s shows that
˜ s(t1) > s(t1) > ˆ s(t1) and ˜ s(t2) < s(t2) = ˆ s(t1): 
As the example illustrates, our analysis simpliﬁes the task of ﬁnding an
optimal contract to a mere computational problem. Typically, the main tech-
nical diﬃculty in deriving the solution is to ﬁnd out which of the incentive
constraints are binding at the optimum. This diﬃculty occurs already in
mechanism design problems with perfect commitment. In many applications
regularity conditions such as the single–crossing property are helpful to iden-
tify binding incentive constraints. With imperfect commitment, however,
the single–crossing condition is in general no longer suﬃcient to detect the
relevant incentive restrictions easily.13 As Laﬀont and Tirole (1993, p. 377)
note, due to the lack of commitment “any incentive constraint could turn
out to be binding at the optimum”. Therefore, one may have to resort to the
straightforward but tedious procedure of solving the optimization problem
by examining all possible constellations case by case (see e.g. Laﬀont and
Tirole (1987)).
6 Multi–Stage Contracting
As indicated in Section 2 we may apply our results also to multi–stage con-
tracting problems. By the technique of dynamic programming such a prob-
lem can be stated as a sequence of static problems. Consider a situation
12Note that the previous example has been constructed in such a way that in the solution
the agent’s strategy assign’s zero probability to the allocation (s(m3);w(m3)) in (12). One
may easily check that the principal’s payoﬀ under the outcome (q;s;wjM) in the previous
example is 105=4: It is thus Pareto dominated by the solution (˜ q; ˜ s; ˜ wjT):
13In our example the incentive constraint for type t2 is binding with full commitment,
whereas it is the incentive constraint for type t1 that is binding with imperfect commit-
ment. The latter observation, however, can be shown to depend on the speciﬁc parameters
of the example.
15in which the principal and the agent contract repeatedly over a sequence,
 = 1;:::; ¯ ; of periods. At each date  the principal can commit himself to
a decision x 2 X; he cannot commit himself to decisions in future periods.
We denote the decisions that have been implemented in the periods up to
date  by ¯ x  (x1;:::;x): The principal’s and the agent’s payoﬀ in period
 depend on ¯ x and the agent’s type ti according to vi(¯ x) and ui(¯ x): We
thus allow for the possibility that current decisions may aﬀect the payoﬀs
at later dates. The parties discount future payoﬀs with the discount factor






1 ui(¯ x): (28)
Let ¯ Ui(¯ x1) denote the reservation utility of the titype agent in period :
The principal enters period  with the belief p1 2 P: He chooses a contract
Γ = (M;x) so that x:M ! X commits him to select x(m) when the
agent’s reporting strategy q:T ! Q selects the message m 2 M:14
The principal faces a dynamic problem whose state at the beginning of
date  is described by (¯ x1;p1): Given a state, he uses the agent’s message
m to update his belief according to some function p:M ! P: This function
together with the contract Γ and the agent’s reporting strategy q deter-
mines the subsequent state (¯ x1;x;p) at date  + 1: We denote the value
functions of the contracting problem by v
i(¯ x1;p1) and u
i(¯ x1;p1);
with v
i ¯ +1 = u
i ¯ +1 = 0: Thus, if the agent’s type is ti; the functions v
i
and u
i describe how the principal’s and the agent’s expected payoﬀs over
the remainder of the contracting problem depend on the current state at the
beginning of period . In what follows, let
Vi(¯ x;p)  vi(¯ x) +  v

i+1(¯ x;p); (29)
Ui(¯ x;p)  ui(¯ x) +  u

i+1(¯ x;p):
To state the principal’s problem at date  in state (¯ x1;p1), deﬁne for
a given message set M = M(¯ x1;p1) the expected payoﬀs
V











14This framework is directly applicable to short–term contracting in a repeated relation-
ship, as e.g. in Laﬀont and Tirole (1987) or Schmidt (1993). By appropriately specifying
the payoﬀs vi();ui() and ¯ Ui(), it can be adapted to study also the renegotiation of
long–term contracts, as e.g. in Hart and Tirole (1988) and Laﬀont and Tirole (1990).




i(qi;p;x; ¯ x1jM): (31)
Given M; the principal’s objective in the state (¯ x1;p1) is to choose x;
q and p to maximize this payoﬀ subject to three constraints: First, the
agent selects his reporting strategy anticipating the eﬀect of his message on
the principal’s belief. Therefore, for all ti 2 T it has to be the case that
U





i;p;x; ¯ x1jM) for all q
0
i 2 Q: (32)
Second, the principal updates his belief according to Bayes’ rule so that
Z
H
pi(m)d¯ q(m) = pi1qi(H) for all H 2 M with ¯ q(H) > 0; (33)
where p0  : Finally, the agent’s individual rationality constraint has to
be satisﬁed for all types to which the principal assigns positive probability.15




i(qi;p;x; ¯ x1jM)  ¯ Ui(¯ x1)
i




) solve the principal’s problem in the state (¯ x1;p1): Then
it follows from the Principle of Optimality that
v









; ¯ x1jM); (35)
u










Therefore, given a collection of (possibly state dependent) message sets M();
 = 1;:::; ¯ ; the value functions of the contracting problem can be derived
recursively to solve the principal’s multi–stage problem backwards from date
 = ¯  to  = 1:16
To apply Proposition 2 to the present context, we say that (q;p;xjM)
is incentive feasible if it satisﬁes (32) and (33). Further (q;p;xjM) is














; ¯ x1jM)  V










; ¯ x1jM) = U

i(qi;p;x; ¯ x1jM);
15As in Section 2, we assume for convenience that the principal wants to guarantee the
participation of all types ti with pi1 > 0:
16If jj = 1; one may derive the value functions by recursive methods as described in
Stokey and Lucas (1989).
17for all ti 2 T: Clearly, a solution to the principal’s problem must be incentive
eﬃcient for any state (¯ x1;p1) in period  that is reached with positive






















) for all ti 2 T: With these
modiﬁcations of our concepts in Section 2 we can prove the following Corol-
lary to Proposition 2:
Corollary Consider a state (¯ x1;p1) in period . If (q;p;xjM) is










are payoﬀ–equivalent. Moreover, q0
i(ti) > 0 for all ti 2 T:
The Corollary implies that in any state (¯ x1;p1) the principal cannot
do better than apply a direct mechanism to solve the following maximization






j pi1qi(tj)Vi (¯ x1;x(tj);p(tj)) (37)
s.t. Ui (¯ x1;x(ti);p(ti))  Ui (¯ x1;x(tj);p(tj));
h
Ui (¯ x1;x(ti);p(ti))  ¯ Ui(¯ x1)
i
pi1  0;
[Ui (¯ x1;x(ti);p(ti))  Ui (¯ x1;x(tj);p(tj))]qi(tj) = 0;
pi(tj)
X
kpk 1 qk (tj) = pi1 qi(tj);
for all ti;tj 2 T: This program together with the recursive determination
of the associated value functions in (35) reduces the problem of multi–stage
mechanism design to a standard dynamic programming problem.
By the last condition of problem (37) the solution of the multi–stage con-
tracting problem determines sequences of beliefs, p0;p1;:::;p¯ ; that support
the principal’s choice of contract in each state as sequentially optimal be-
havior. As the Corollary indicates and our example shows, under imperfect
commitment the optimal mechanism may induce the agent to reveal his infor-
mation only partially. In multi–stage settings this means that the principal’s
beliefs are updated on the basis of a gradual revelation of information, as in
Dewatripont (1989) and Hart and Tirole (1988).
7 Concluding Remarks
The contribution of this paper is an extension of the revelation principle to
contracting problems with limited commitment. Our main result provides a
useful tool for the study of such problems between a principal and a single
18agent. It shows that the solution can be found in a subset of the set of
incentive compatible allocations. By precisely stating the constraints that
go beyond incentive compatibility, we derive a programming problem that
can be used to study a wide variety of contracting situations with imperfect
commitment.
As most of the literature on imperfect commitment, our analysis addresses
contracting problems between a principal and a single agent. In Bester and
Strausz (2000) we give an example which shows that a direct mechanism
may no longer be optimal when the principal contracts with two agents.
Therefore, it remains an open question to what extent one can character-
ize optimal mechanisms in settings with limited commitment and multiple
agents. Green and Laﬀont’s (1987) study of ‘posterior implementable’ rules
makes a step in this direction by describing feasible agreements when no
binding commitments are possible during the communication stage.
198 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: Let K = fK1;:::;Kk;:::g be a partition of M: Then
for any  = (1;:::;k;::::) such that
k  0 for all Kk 2 K;
X
k k qi(Kk) = 1 for all ti 2 T; (38)





k k qi(H \ Kk) (39)
for all ti 2 T and all H 2 M: Indeed, by (38), we have q0
i 2 Q for all
ti 2 T: We now show that incentive feasibility of (q;p;y;xjM) implies that
also (q0;p;y;xjM) is incentive feasible. Notice that (3) implies
Ui(x(m);y(m)) = U















i maximizes the type tiagents expected payoﬀ, which proves
that (q0;p;y;xjM) satisﬁes condition (3). To show that (q0;p;y;xjM) satisﬁes
condition (4) consider any H 2 M and let Hk  H \ Kk: Then, by (4)
Z
Hk
pi(m)d¯ q = iqi(Hk) (42)














so that consistency with Bayes’ rule is satisﬁed. Finally, condition (2) is
trivially satisﬁed for (q0;p;y;xjM) because it holds for (q;p;y;xjM):








Incentive eﬃciency of (q;p;y;xjM) implies that 0 = (1;:::;1;:::) maximizes
this payoﬀ subject to (38). Therefore, there exists a  = (1;:::;i;:::;jTj)





















for all Kk 2 K: Since (46) must hold for any arbitrary partition K of M;
this proves the statement of the lemma. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1: Note that by conditions (3) and (4)
[Ui(x(m);y(m))  U

i (q;y;xjM)] pi(m) = 0 ¯ q  almost everywhere: (47)
Indeed, suppose there is a H 2 M such
R
H pi(m)d¯ q > 0 and Ui(x(m);y(m))
6= U
i (q;y;xjM) for all m 2 H: Then condition (4) requires qi(H) > 0: Yet,
as condition (3) implies (40), we have qi(H) = 0; a contradiction.
By Lemma 1 and (47) the support of ¯ q contains a set ¯ M 2 M with
¯ q( ¯ M) = 1 such that the following two properties are satisﬁed: First, there is









i (q;y;xjM)] pi(m) = 0 for all m 2 ¯ M: (49)
Moreover, since ¯ q( ¯ M) = 1 implies qi( ¯ M) = 1; it follows from (4) that
Z
¯ M






Deﬁne ¯ P = fp(m)jm 2 ¯ Mg and let co( ¯ P) denote the convex hull of
¯ P: By a theorem of Rubin and Wesler (1958), it follows from (50) that
 2 co( ¯ P): Since co( ¯ P) lies on the hyperplane
n





; it may be
represented as a set in I R
jTj1: Therefore, Caratheodory’s theorem asserts that
 may be written as a convex combination of jM0j  jTj linearly independent
vectors p(m1);:::;p(mjM0j) in ¯ P: Thus there exists  = (1;:::;h;:::;jM0j)
such that h  0;
P
hh = 1 and
X
hh p(mh) = : (51)
Consider the message set M0 = fm1;:::;mh;:::;mjM0jg associated with the
vectors p(m1);:::;p(mh);:::;p(mjM0j) and deﬁne for all H 2 M the agent’s










i 2 Q: The vectors q0(mh); h = 1;:::;jM0j; are linearly independent
because the vectors p(mh); h = 1;:::;jM0j; are linearly independent.
We now show that (q0;p;y;xjM) is incentive feasible. First, condition
(2) is trivially satisﬁed because (q0;p;y;xjM) and (q;p;y;xjM) diﬀer only
in the agent’s strategy. Second we have q0
i(M0) = 1 and q0
i(mh) > 0 only if











i (m) for all q
00
i 2 Q:
This proves that (q0;p;y;xjM) satisﬁes condition (3). Finally, (q0;p;y;xjM)











j hpj(mh) = i q
0
i(mh) (54)
for all mh 2 M0:
It remains to show that (q0;p;y;xjM) and (q;p;y;xjM) are payoﬀ–equiva-
lent. By (53) we have U
i (q;y;xjM) = U
i (q0;y;xjM) for all ti 2 T: Suppose
that V (q;y;xjM) 6= V (q0;y;xjM): Because (q;p;y;xjM) is incentive eﬃ-
cient, this implies V (q;y;xjM) > V (q0;y;xjM): Therefore, using (4), we



























because ¯ q 0( ¯ M) = ¯ q 0(M0) = 1: Since by condition (4)
R
M pi(m)d¯ q(m) = i
=
R
M pi(m)d¯ q 0(m); the inequality in (55) cannot hold. This contradiction
proves that (q0;p;y;xjM) and (q;p;y;xjM) are payoﬀ–equivalent. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: Because we can simply delete from M any H 2 M
such that ¯ q 0(H) = 0; Proposition 1 guarantees that there exists a mechanism
(M0;x0) with jM0j  jTj and an incentive feasible (q0;p0;y0;x0jM0) which
is payoﬀ–equivalent to (q;p;y;xjM): Let ΩM0 = [q0(mh)]mh2M0 denote the
jTj  jM0j matrix with column vectors q0(mh);h = 1;:::;jM0j: Note that by
Proposition 1 the column vectors of ΩM0 are linearly independent.
Deﬁne the correspondence D:M0 ) T by D(mh) = ftijq0
i(mh) > 0g: It
follows that D(H) = [H ftijq0
i(mh) > 0;mh 2 Hg: We claim that jD(H)j 
jHj for all H  M0: Indeed, ﬁx H  M0 and consider the jTj  jHj matrix
22ΩH = [q0(mh)]mh2H: Since the matrix ΩM0 consists of linearly independent
column vectors, this also holds for ΩH. Consequently, Rank(ΩH) = jHj.
Note further that the matrix ΩH has only jD(H)j non–null row vectors.
This implies that Rank(ΩH)  jD(H)j. Hence, it follows that jD(H)j 
jHj. Lemma 2 therefore asserts the existence of a mapping d:M0 ! T with
d(mh) 2 D(mh) and the property that d(mh) = d(mk) implies mh = mk:
We now use d() to construct a mapping c:T ! M0 in the following
way: Since the mapping d() is invertible we can set c(d(mh)) = mh for
each mh 2 M0: As d(mh) 2 D(mh) we have q0
i(c(ti)) > 0 for all ti 2 T o 
fd(mh)jmh 2 M0g: To each ti = 2 T o we can assign an arbitrary c(ti) 2 M0
such that q0
i(c(ti)) > 0: Such a c(ti) exists because
P
hq0
i(mh) = 1: Thus the
mapping c() satisﬁes qi(c(ti)) > 0 for all ti 2 T: Moreover, as [To c(ti) = M0
we have that
S(mh)  ftijmh = c(ti)g 6= ; (56)
for all mh 2 M0:
Now we replace the mechanism (M0;x0) and (q0;p0;y0;x0jM0) by a direct





; ˆ p(tj) = p
0(c(tj)); ˆ y(tj) = y
0(c(tj)); ˆ x(tj) = x
0(c(tj)): (57)
Note that ˆ qi(ti) > 0 for all ti 2 T: Thus, to complete the proof, it is suﬃ-
cient to show that (ˆ q; ˆ p; ˆ y; ˆ xjT) is incentive feasible and payoﬀ–equivalent to
(q0;p0;y0;x0jM0):
By (57), ˆ qi(tj) = q0












i(mh) = 1; (58)
so that ˆ qi deﬁnes a probability distribution on T: Since (ˆ x(tj); ˆ y(tj)) =
(x0(c(tj));y0(c(tj))); any allocation that the agent induces by some message
tj 2 T under the mechanism (T; ˆ x) he can also induce by the message c(tj) 2
M under the mechanism (M0;x0): Conversely, as for each mh 2 M there is a
ti 2 T such that mh = c(ti); anything that he can induce under (M0;x0) he
can also induce under (T; ˆ x): Therefore U
i (ˆ q; ˆ y; ˆ xjT) = U
i (q0;y0;x0jM0) for
all ti 2 T: Moreover, ˆ qi(tj) > 0 if and only if q0
i(c(tj)) > 0: Thus ˆ q satisﬁes
condition (3).














23Since ˆ p(tj) = p0(c(tj)) and ˆ x(tj) = x0(c(tj)); the principal’s choice ˆ y(tj) =
y0(c(tj)) satisﬁes condition (2). Finally, under (q0;p0;y0;x0jM0) the titype
agent induces the allocation (x0(mh);y0(mh)) with probability q0
i(mh): Under
(ˆ q; ˆ p; ˆ y; ˆ xjT) he induces the same allocation with the same probability, as
P
tj2S(mh) ˆ qi(tj) = q0
i(mh): Therefore, V (ˆ q; ˆ y; ˆ xjT) = V (q0;y0;x0jM0): Q.E.D.
Proof of the Corollary: To apply the proofs of Lemma 1 and of Proposi-
tions 1 and 2, replace (q;p;y;x) by (q;p;x) and the functions Ui(); Vi();
U




i(): Further replace  by p1
and note that instead of (2) – (4) the incentive feasibility conditions (32) and
(33) apply.
Consider a state (¯ x1;p1). If pi1 > 0 for all ti 2 T; the Corollary
follows directly from the arguments leading to Proposition 2. If pi1 = 0
for some ti 2 T; we proceed in two steps: First, we apply Proposition 2
to the reduced type space T 0  fti 2 Tjpi1 > 0g to show that there is
a direct mechanism (T 0;x0
) and an incentive feasible (q0
;p0
;x0
jT 0) that is
payoﬀ–equivalent and satisﬁes q0
i(ti) > 0 for all ti 2 T 0:
Second, to extend (q0
;p0
;x0
) to the original type space T; select for every
ti 2 TnT 0 some message mi 2 M in the support of qi that maximizes
Ui(¯ x1;x();p()): Deﬁne x0
(ti) = x(mi) and p0
(ti) = p(mi); further
deﬁne q0
i(ti) = 1 and q0
j(ti) = 0 for all tj 6= ti. Thus q0




jT) satisﬁes the incentive feasibility conditions (32)
and (33). In addition, (q0
;p0
;x0
jT) is payoﬀ–equivalent to (q;p;xjM):
Q.E.D.
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